Gary Kendrick, Inc., Dba Gary\u27s Drywall and Peterson Glass Company v. Gene W. Miller Ad Ruth B. Miller : Brief of Respondents by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
Gary Kendrick, Inc., Dba Gary's Drywall and
Peterson Glass Company v. Gene W. Miller Ad
Ruth B. Miller : Brief of Respondents
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Hillyard, Low & Anderson; Attorneys for Defendants-
RespondentsOlson, Hoggan & Sorenson; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation





~ "GaRY' S DRYWALL 




Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY KENDRICK, Inc., dba 
GARY'S DRYWALL and PETERSON 
GLASS COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
GENE W. MILLER and RUTH B. 
MILLER, 
Civil No. 15995 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
Appeal from the District Court of Cache County, Utah 
Honorable VeNoy Christof fersen 
OLSON, HOGGAN & SORENSON 
David w. Sorenson 
56 West Center 
Logan, Utah 84321 
HILLYARD, LOW & ANDERSON 
Gary N. Anderson 
175 East 1st North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondent 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Subject 
Statement of the Nature of the Case • 
Disposition of the Case in Lower Court 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
Statement of Facts 







The District Court did not commit an abuse of 
discretion in ruling the lien release, issued 
in blank by the supplier, to be valid. 
Conclusion 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES AND AUTHORITIES CITED 
and Construction Co. v. 
397 SW wd 616 
Townsend v. Barlow, 101 Conn. 86, 124 A. 832 
Brown v. Willimas, 120 Pa. 24, 13 A. 519 
Brimwood Homes, Inc. v. Kundsen Builders Supply 
Co., (Utah) 14 Ut. (2d) 419, 385 P2d 982 
LeGrand Johnson Construction Co. v. Kennedy 
541 P2d 1038 
TEXT CITED 









53 Am. Jur. 2nd, Mechanics Liens, Sec. 293, p. 827 8 
53 Am. Jur. 2nd, Mechanics Liens, Sec. 294, p. 828 9 
5, 
10 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GARY KENDRICK, Inc., dba 
GARY'S DRYWALL and PETERSON 
GLASS COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 





Civil No. 15995 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by Plaintiff to recover for labor and 
materials supplied to Defendants under Sections 14-2-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953 as amended. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court barred Plaintiff-Appellant '_s recovery 
of $1309.00 of the total-amount claimed by reason of a 
receipt and lien release executed by Plaintiff-Appellant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents ask this Court to sustain the 
findings and decision of the lower court which barred Plaintiff-
Appellant from recovering $1309.00 of the total amount 
claimed. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants-Respondents agree with the statement of 
facts in Plaintiff's brief with the following additions: 
There was a practice of dealing between Plaintiff and 
Laron Wardle whereby the Plaintiff issued lien releases ~ 
Wardle with authority to complete them. (Tr. p. 22, line 
15-20 and also Tr. p. 23, lines 23-25 and p. 24, line 1-lli. 
Plaintiff understood that the purpose of the lien releae 
was to evidence receipt of payment and for releasing a~ 
claim by the Plaintiff on the home of the Defendants. (Tr. 
p. 24, lines l2-25). 
The lien release in question was presented to Defendant 
Bank for payment on the Plaintiff's home and the bank honw 
it. (Tr. p. 35, lines 11-12, also Tr. p. 32, lines 7-23). 
The contractor had three jobs going at the same time. 
(Tr. p. 30, lines 15-17) Plaintiff was aware of the fact 
the contractor was working on more than one job. (Tr. P· lC 
1 ines 23-25) • 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court for Cache County properly ruled that 
where the Plaintiff issued to the contractor lien releans 
in blank and gave authority to the contractor to compleU 
the instruments and one of the releases was relied on by 
Defendants' bank to make payments out of Defendants 
the lien release was valid against the Plaintiff. 
•account 
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The instant case is very similar to·the LeGrand Johnson 
Construction Company v. Kennedy 541 P.2d 1038 case cited by 
Plaintiff and relied upon by the lower Court. Plaintiff 
tries to distinguish the case on the basis of.the facts, but 
they are really distinctions without any difference. The 
basic issue is whether the bank which was handling Defendant's 
money was correct in relying on the lien release which was 
submitted in making payments to Sundown Construction, the 
Contractor. 
It is undisputed that the contractor made it a practice 
to obtain from the Plaintiff lien releases for obtaining 
payments from lending institutions. It is also undisputed 
that the lien releases were executed in blank and the contractor 
was given authority to fill in the blanks. The lien waiver 
in question was duly presented to Defendants' bank and the 
bank relied upon the Plaintiff's signature in advancing 
money to the contractor. The Plaintiff clearly understood 
the purpose of the lien release was to obtain money from the 
bank holding the money and to release any lien rights which 
could be claimed by Plaintiff. 
In LeGrand Johnson Construction Company v. Kennedy, 
supra, this court ruled that where there had been a practice 
of dealing between the building contractor and the supplier 
whereby the .supplier issued to the contractor lien waivers 
and releases in blank and gave authority to the contractor 
to complete the instruments and the supplier gave the contractor's 
agent a blank lien release for the purpose of releasing any 
claim of lien by the supplier on the construction of xhe 
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• 
owner's structure, the lien waiver is valid. 
Appellant's first attempt to draw a distinction betweer, 
Johnson v. Kennedy, supra, and the present case is that the 
contractor, in Johnson v. Kennedy failed to designate the 
specific accounts for whj.ch the money should be applied, 
Respondents contend this distinction is irrelevant in ~~ 
particular case. It is clear Wardle, the con tractor, had a:, 
account with the materialman and that Plaintiffs knew of at 
least two jobs because the other lien release on the Miller 
home was executed by the Plaintiff's agent on the same date 
(Exhibits 4 and 5). It is also clear that Plaintiff's~~ 
knew that the receipt and lien release would be used by the 
contractor to get money from the lending institution holdinc 
the owner's money. (Tr. p.24, lines 12-15). Under thee 
circumstances it is basic agency law that Plaintiff should 
bear the responsibility for the acts of the Contractor. 3 II 
2nd "Agency" Section 76: 
•• the rule is that where a principal has, by his 
voluntary act, placed an agent in such a situation tha! 
a person of ordinary prudence conversant with business 
usages and the nature of the particular business is 
justified in assuming that such agent has authoriey~ 
perform a particular act and deals with the agent upon 
that assumption, the principal is estopped as again~ 
such third person from denying the agent's authoriey; 
was, in fact, less extensive than that with which he 
was apparetitly clothed. This rule has been based ~m 
the principle that were one of two innocent parties 
must suffer from the wrongful act of another, the loss 
should fall upon the one who, by his conduct created 
the circumstances which enabled the third party to 
perpetrate the wrong and cause the loss. 
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The owner suffered as a result of .the contractors' 
wrongdoings (Tr. pp.36-37 and p. 40, lines 4-16.) and Plaintiff 
is now insisting the Defendant homeowners should pay twice 
for the dry wall even though Plaintiff was the one who 
signed the the receipt and lien release in blank. 
Appellant maintains that Johnson v. Kennedy can be 
distinguished on the facts in that Wardle, unlike the contractor 
in Johnson v. Kennedy first paid in full the Stewart .Hill 
Job with his own funds and received a lien release concurrent 
therewith. Although Appellant has correctly stated the 
facts, the distinction is irrelevant to a third party. The 
essential element in Johnson v. Kennedy was -that the lien 
waiver was presented to the Defendant's bank and the bank 
relied upon the signature of the subcontractors in advancing' 
the money obtained by the contractor. The sequence of 
events in the instant case does not change this basic similarity. 
Appellant argues that the contractor in Johnson v. Kennedy 
created an open account covering several jobs by letting 
payments to suppliers go. It is argued that Wardle paid his 
bills prior to the time Plaintiff was to furnish labor and 
materials to Defendant's home. Exhibits 4 and 5 reflect 
work done on two separate homes. Both documents were executed 
on the same day. Respondents submit that Plaintiffs were 
aware that Wardle was working on more than one job and knew 
or should have known that what the Contractor actually di~ 
with the blank lien releases was possible, that is: a.blank 
lien release could be presented to the wrong bank so the 
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contractor could be paid twice. The responsibility for such 
an occurence should rest with the Plaintiff who was the 0~ 
who signed the lien release in blank. 
Appellant attempts to distinguish the instant case froi 
Johnson v. Kennedy in that Wardle paid for the lien releaH 
before he submitted it to anyone else whereas in Johnson, 
the contractor first obtained lien waivers to obtain ot~r 
jobs. The fact of the matter is that the Plaintiff never 
received the total amount owed from the contract on the jobs 
he had going with the Plaintff, otherwise he would never 
have filed an action under the bonding statute. It fol~n 
that the money from Logan Savings and Loan which should have 
gone to the Stewart Hill job never found its way there since 
Defendant's money from First National Bank is what reirnburse1 
the Contractor for his payment to the Plaintiff. The 
question again is: Should the owner who relied on a receipt 
signed by Plaintiff be held responsible for Plaintiff's 
negligence in signing the receipt in blank? 
Finally, it is argued that Wardle always paid for the 
lien releases ~t the same~time and that he designated the 
job for which the payment was to be applied. Appellants 
point out that the contractor in Johnson made it a practi~ 
of obtaining lien releases for the purpose of obtaining 
money from the lenders. Respondents submit that Wardle has 
not paid the full amount on Plaintiff's Exhibit 4, despite 
the fact that the document reflected "payment in full." 
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Appellants argue that the conduct of Wardle should not 
operate as an estoppel to Plaintiff since the intention of 
Wardle and Plaintiff was to release the Stewart Hill Job and 
not the Defendants. It is argued that while Wardle did 
change the intent of the lien release, he did so without the 
knowledge or intent of Plaintiff and therefore, he acted 
beyond the scope of his authority. 
Plaintiffs have admitted the validity of the signatures 
on the lien releases. The First National Bank of Logan knew 
that the Plaintiffs were subcontractors on the Miller home 
and that work was being done on the Miller home at that 
time. Once these facts were established, the bank's responsibilit 
was ended. See, 3 Am. Jur. 2nd, Agency, Section 76, supra .• 
In Midwest Engineering and Construction Co. v. Compagna 
(Mo.) 397 SW 2d 616, the court held that a party executing a 
lien waiver will not be heard to assert its invalidity as 
against an owner who has paid out money or otherwise changed 
his position to his detriment in reliance upon the waiver. 
Respondents ask this court to compare the equities of a 
subcontractor signing blank lien releases and then bringing 
litigation against a defendant-owner who, according to the 
record, had already paid considerable money in addition to 
the original loan for the construction of his home. 
Plaintiff asserts that no consideration was received by 
it for the lien release. On the contrary, Plaintiff 
received $1309.00 for signing the lien release. The fact 
that Plaintiff applied that money to a different account is 
not Defendant's fault. Plaintiff got $1309.00 for signing 
the paper and Defendant should be given credit for that Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Techn logy Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
since his money was disbursed on the basis of that · signature, 
Plaintiffs assert that knowledge, intention or conse~ 
of the person entitled to lien is necessary to waive a lien, 
The Plaintiff knew what a lien release was for. (Tr. p. 24, 
lines 12-22) The language on the release itself is instructiv 
"This receipt is executed and delivered by the unders~ 
to the corpora ti on to induce it to make payment to the 
~ndersigned of the above st~ted sum from funds held ~ 
it for owner of above described real property and in 
consideration thereof the undersigned hereby waives, 
releases and discharged [sic) any lien undersigned hu 
or may have against said real property." 
Plaintiff most certainly intended to release a lien and 
induce a lending institution to make payment. The only 
problem that arose was that the wrong bank disbursed the 
money. For Plaintiff to assert that it should not be held 
responsible for the lien waiver it signed in blank is to 
assert that a person should not be responsible for his check 
which is signed in blank and given to someone else to fill 
in. 
Appellant argues that "while a lien release may be 
executed releasing fully, all claims due and owing at the 
time the lien release was given, it certainly cannot be 
construed to apply to materials or labor supplied after t~ 
date of the ~elease." 53 Am Jur. 2d, Mechanic's Lien,. Sec. 
293 is cited as authority for the argument. Respondent does 
not think this citation stands for the argument advanced. 
The general rule is stated in 53 Am Jur 2d, Mechanic's 
Liens, Sec. 294: 
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A release in general terms executed by mechanics 
and materialmen operates to discharge the property from 
their liens for work done and materials furnished 
after, as well as before, its execution. Thus, in 
construing a waiver given to facilitate a loan upon the 
security of the lien and stating that the lienors nhave 
waived and relinquished and do hereby waive and relinquish 
all liens and claims of liens we now have or hereafter 
may have" upon the land and buildings in question nfor 
labor done and materials furnished for the construction 
and erection of said building," it must be held that 
the waiver was not only of the right to liens for "work 
done", but also the right to liens for work done 
and materials furnished subsequently to the date of 
the waiver. 
Townsend v. Barlow, 101 Conn 86, 124 A. 832, and Brown v. Will 
120 Pa. 24, 13 A. 519 are cited as authority in other jurisdiction 
Not only does the lien release refer to future liens 
which may arise, but the authorities cited by appellant turn 
on the question of consideration. In Brimwood Homes, Inc. 
v. Kundsen Builders Supply Co. 385 P2d 982, the reason the 
lien waiver was not recognized with respect to future work 
was that consideration was not received for the lien waiver. 
In the instant case consideration was received when the 
release was signed. Also the fact situation is much more 
similar to Johnson v. Kennedy, supra, than it is to the 
Brimwood Homes, case. 
A final argument advanced by appellants is that what-
ever the contractor did was outside the scope of his authority 
and therefore should not operate to bar appellant's claim 
for $1309.00. Basic agency law does not agree with this 
conclusion. See 3 Arn Jur 2d, Agency, Sec. 76. supra 
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CONCLUSION 
On June 1, 1978, the District Court in Cache County 
allowed a se.toff of $1309 against Plaintiff's claim. The 
Court ruled that inasmuch'as the Plaintiff issued to the 
general contractor lien waivers and releases in blank, a~ 
gave them to the contractor to complete, the lien release in 
question is valid against the Plaintiff. 
' 
This Court sustained the same court on a similar set~ 
facts in October, 1975, by ruling in Johnson v. Kennedy, 
supra, that where there had been a practice of dealing between 
the building contractor and the supplier whereby the supplier 
issued to the contractor lien waivers and releases in blank 
and gave authority to the contractor to complete the instrume 
and the supplier gave the contractor a blank lien release 
i 
for the purpose of releasing any claim of lien by the supplier 
on the construction of the homeowner' s residence, the lien 
waiver was valid. The instant case comes within the ambit 
of Johnson v. Kennedy and the lower Court's ruling should 
again be sustained. 
DATED this 13~h day of October, 1978. 
R~spectfulJ.y Submitted, 
HILLYARD, LOW & ANDERSON 
Gar~~ 
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I hereby certify that I delivered two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Respondents' Brief to David w. 
Sorenson, Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant, at 56 West 
Center Street, Logan, Utah this 
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16th day of October, 1978. 
Marlene R. Pehler 
Secretary 
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